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ABSTRACT 
 
Little is known about individual differences in loss aversion. This is particularly surprising if one 
considers the strong emphasis on individual differences in both economics and psychology. A Loss 
Aversion Questionnaire is proposed as an instrument that is capable of measuring interindividual 
differences in loss aversion. Two studies (N1 = 187; N2 = 455) were conducted to validate the 
measure. Results support the view that loss aversion can be conceptualized as a measure of 
interindividual difference. Various groups (students, entrepreneurs, managers, and civil servants) 
were found to differ significantly in the degree to which they displayed loss aversion. Furthermore, 
we report on issues of differential validity with other well-known concepts such as risk aversion, 
impulsivity, and anxiety 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the widespread acceptance of prospect theory and its emphasis on loss aversion, 
little or nothing is known about individual differences in loss aversion. Mohammed and Schwall 
(2009) note a surprising and consistent reluctance to include individual differences in decision-
making studies. This is certainly the case in the study of decisions that involve risk. Individual 
differences are usually disregarded when interpreting the descriptive/normative gap in risk 
assessment (Stanovich & West, 1998), and not much has changed since Li and Liu’s (2008) warning 
that individual differences have received too little attention in studies on risk preference. 
This gap in the research is particularly surprising if one considers the strong emphasis on 
individual differences in fields such as economics and psychology. Modern economic theory even 
puts the concept of heterogeneity at its core (Hommes, 2006). Nobel laureate Kenneth J. Arrow has 
emphasized that, in microeconomics, heterogeneity of expectations may be the most fundamental 
starting point. Without heterogeneity, there is no trade (Arrow, 2004). In psychology, cognitive 
styles, personality, cognitive abilities, and cognitive strategies represent fundamental determinants 
of individual and organizational behavior that become apparent in individual workplace actions and 
in organizational systems, processes, and routines (e.g. Sadler-Smith, 2009). 
More specifically, it is remarkable how little attention has been paid to interindividual 
differences with respect to the longstanding concept of loss aversion. The impact on loss aversion of 
sociodemographic individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, or profession has been 
investigated in behavioral economics (e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 2003; Gächter, Johnson, & Herrmann, 
2007; Haigh & List, 2005; Schmidt & Traub, 2002). However, the interest from personality 
psychologists has been minimal. Thus far, there are no answers to questions such as: Is loss aversion 
a personality trait? If it is, how stable is it over time and situations? Is it correlated with personality 
factors such as trait anxiety or sensation seeking? 
Our study is intended to contribute to the loss aversion literature in a number of ways. First, 
we address the issue of individual differences in loss aversion. Second, with regard to its 
measurement, we question the current use of mathematical choice dilemmas, and address issues of 
generalizability, and external and predictive validity. Finally, we propose a new instrument for loss 
aversion that is capable of measuring individual differences, namely a psychometric scale entitled the 
Loss Aversion Questionnaire (LAQ). 
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PROSPECT THEORY AND LOSS AVERSION 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is a model in the field of decision making and 
risk psychology that effectively describes how individuals differ from normative models in their day-
to-day decision making. A central assumption of prospect theory is that the probability weighting 
function for risk-involved decisions toward gains has greater curvature than the function for losses. 
This was first described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as loss aversion, referring to the fact that 
“losses loom larger than gains.” 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) suggest that risk attitude includes three separate 
components: basic utility, probability weighting, and loss aversion. Loss aversion is deemed 
responsible for the largest part of risk aversion, and it refers to the tendency of people making 
subjective evaluations to place greater weight on losses than on objective equivalent gains. 
Outcomes are evaluated as losses (or gains) if they are below (or above) a reference outcome, which 
can be a status quo or an “aspiration level” (Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999). Indeed, one of the 
fundamentals of prospect theory is that people frame a problem around a reference point 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a phenomenon termed reference dependence (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1991). In decision choices, loss aversion will play its role if something is framed as a loss rather than a 
gain relative to the reference point. 
Loss aversion is frequently used to explain facts that are often observed, but it lacks a 
coherent explanation, which is not provided by expected-utility economic theories such as the 
endowment effect, status quo bias, and the Willingness to Accept–Willingness to Pay (WTA–WTP) 
gap (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). It has also been used to explain a wide array of 
nonlaboratory phenomena (for an overview, see Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb, & McGuire, 
2011) such as the behavior of cab drivers, who stop work earlier on days with bad weather, when 
their number of fares is highest (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, & Thaler, 2000), or the fact that 
progress made by racial minorities is perceived differently according to group membership (Eibach & 
Keegan, 2006). 
The existence of loss aversion has thus been extensively shown in a vast number of situations 
and via multiple research methods, ranging from economic and psychological laboratory studies to 
field studies, and by neurobiological approaches such as measuring skin conductance response 
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009) or pupil dilation and heart rate (Hochman & Yechiam, in press), and the 
use of fMRI scans (e.g. Rick, in press) 
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MEASUREMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN LOSS AVERSION 
 
In his review of psychology and economics, Rabin (1998) emphasized the importance of loss 
aversion as a psychological phenomenon that should be integrated into the field of economics. 
Although risk and loss aversion are seen as crossovers between economics and psychology, the main 
body of research still focuses on the economics side. Consequently, measurement is usually in the 
form of mathematical choice dilemmas. The question arises whether the predictive validity of 
expected-utility-based assessments of loss aversion is sufficient. Such assessments typically consist of 
short, novel tasks that require participants simply to select between a provided set of alternatives. 
This type of task limits choice and restricts behavior, thereby giving personality traits little time to 
manifest (Mohammed & Schwall, 2009). A loss aversion questionnaire that does not utilize choice 
dilemmas may thus have better predictive validity. Mathematically formulated questionnaires also 
impose severe problems in measuring loss aversion among innumerate people. Moreover, even 
within economics, the predictive validity of such mathematical choices can be called into question. 
Kusev, van Schaik, Ayton, Dent and Chater (2009) disproved the assumption that decisions involving 
monetary gambles are predictive of domain-independent risk preferences, and even for same-
domain preferences such as finances. In addition, because of their choice dilemma nature, most loss-
aversion studies are conducted in laboratories using young, well-educated student subjects (Gächter 
et al., 2007), thereby limiting possible variation. The general problem of external validity of 
laboratory experiments raises further methodological issues (Allport, 1968). Lange and Ratan (2010) 
recently investigated and confirmed this in the case of loss aversion and concluded with a word of 
caution regarding transferring findings from laboratory experiments to the field. The research field is 
thus in need of a psychometric tool to measure loss aversion outside the games and decisions 
framework and the laboratory. This instrument will also enable researchers to relate loss aversion to 
other individual differences such as cognitive styles or personality. 
Although classical decision theory has regarded risk propensity as situational (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), it has long been acknowledged that individual risk attitude is a key part of personality 
(for an overview, see Mohammed & Schwall, 2009). We argue that loss aversion differs significantly 
across individuals, which is supported by the findings of Gächter et al. (2007). They found individual 
heterogeneity in loss aversion in their experiment: 4.9% of respondents were loss seeking, 7.1% were 
loss neutral, and 88% were loss averse. More importantly, the 88% loss-averse individuals differed in 
their degree of loss aversion; among them 10% were even classified as “very strongly loss averse.” 
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From the abovementioned research, we may infer that individual differences in loss aversion 
do exist. We propose that they can be measured with a psychometric questionnaire to overcome the 
issues associated with mathematical choice dilemmas. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Individual differences in loss aversion can be measured with a psychometric 
questionnaire. 
 
For the relation between loss aversion and personality traits, we can refer to the research 
into the relation between risk aversion and personality traits. In a study of reported risk taking over 
several decision domains, risk taking overall was associated positively with extraversion and 
openness, and negatively with neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Nicholson, Soane, 
Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005). Another study found that risk taking was positively associated 
with openness and negatively with agreeableness and conscientiousness (Kowert & Hermann, 1997). 
According to Soane and Chmiel (2005), the research into the relationship between risk and 
personality has two important ramifications. First, people will avoid (or take) risks consistent with 
their character. Second, because personality is relatively stable throughout adulthood (McCrae & 
Costa, 1997), the tendency to avoid (or take) risks may also be robust. In line with their research, we 
propose that loss aversion is also correlated with stable personality traits. 
As stated above, loss aversion is thought to be responsible for the majority of risk aversion 
(Kobberling & Wakker, 2005); thus, the following hypothesis can be deduced. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Loss aversion is positively related to risk aversion. 
 
It has been suggested by Camerer (2005) that the basis of loss aversion lies in fear. This is 
supported by the finding by De Martino et al. (2010) that patients with lesions to the amygdala, the 
brain region associated with fear processing, experienced no loss aversion. In addition, Loewenstein 
(2001) proposed that, in line with this risk-as-feelings hypothesis, risk-related research should take 
emotions into account. Considering the neurological basis and support from the risk-as-feelings 
hypothesis, we will investigate the relationship between loss aversion and fear. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Loss aversion is positively related to anxiety. 
 
 
It has been suggested that the neural systems responsible for loss aversion are the same as 
those for impulsive behavior (e.g. Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). Damage to the DA system, for 
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instance, leads to a diminished sensitivity to loss aversion, but is at the same time responsible for 
increased impulsivity. We therefore make the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Loss aversion is negatively related to impulsivity. 
 
METHOD 
 
Constructing the Loss Aversion Questionnaire 
 
We created an initial pool of items based on an extensive study of the loss aversion 
literature. In addition, a convenience sample of nine adults (mean age = 38.7 yr., five men and four 
women) were interviewed about their experience of and emotions toward the subject of loss and 
loss aversion. Sixty items were derived from the literature study and the interviews. Of those 60 
items, we selected 20 items, after taking several criteria into account. We aimed to select a wide 
variety of losses, such as in personal affairs, reputation, status, and identity. Both positively and 
negatively formulated items were included to avoid acquiescence bias (Billiet & McClendon, 2000). 
To ensure content validity (Haynes, Richard, & Kubany, 1995; Most & Zeidner, 1995), three experts in 
the field of decision making judged the content and relevance of the original 60 items. Modifications 
such as the removal of synonymic items were made and double negations were removed. Feedback 
from the experts suggested that the items had acceptable face validity. Based on their review, 20 
items were retained for use in the first test version of the Loss Aversion Questionnaire. 
In the first two preliminary studies the reliability, consistency, and validity were tested. 
 
Preliminary Study 1 
 
In study 1, the 20 items retained based on the expert review were tested for the first time 
among a random selection of participants. 
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Sample and Procedure 
A survey was conducted of 65 conference attendees from a variety of Belgian organizations. 
One of the authors of this study was a guest speaker and invited attendees to participate in the 
study. Ninety paper-and-pencil surveys were distributed and 65 were returned, indicating a response 
rate of 72%. The questionnaire consisted of English items; all conference attendees were 
multilingual, because they were attending a conference conducted in the English language. To 
minimize bias because of social desirability, confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed. The 
sample consisted of 37 men (56.90%) and 28 women (43.10%), with a mean age of 41.23 (SD = 9.84), 
ranging from 24 to 69 yr. The average educational level was high; the majority of people in the 
sample held a university degree (67.70%), 18.50% a postgraduate degree, and 13.80% a secondary 
education degree. 
 
Measures and Results 
 
All 20 items were answered on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree) to indicate the extent to which the respondent agreed with the statement. Participants were 
invited to write down qualitative feedback or provide it orally. 
Loss Aversion 
The 20 items had a Cronbach’s  of .62 (Table 1). 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Preliminary Study 2 
 
Based on qualitative feedback from preliminary study 1, five items were altered to achieve 
positive wording and less cognitive complexity. Based on previous experience and further theoretical 
research, five further items were added to improve quality. The following five items were reworded 
(strikethrough indicates removed words, bold indicates new words). 
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I really don’t care feel awful if someone talks bad about me behind my back. 
I don’t care It’s horrible if my your boss thinks less of me you than I’m you’re really worth. 
I wouldn’t care if I had I would have problems with having to move to a smaller place. 
I would never accept have no problem accepting a job that has less pay than my 
previous/current one. 
I wouldn’t like it would feel very tense if the company changed our way of working. 
 
In addition, the following five extra items were added. 
 
21. I always save my computer files in different locations. 
22. I think I could cope with losing all my belongings in a fire. 
23. I think I would go crazy, being locked up in prison. 
24. I would be okay with trading my current car (bike) for a cheaper model. 
25. I get easily attached to material things (my car, my furniture …). 
 
Moreover, items from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) for 
measuring anxiety were added to the survey to test their reliability for the validation study. 
Sample and Procedure 
 
A survey was conducted among 122 participants from a variety of Belgian organizations. Two 
hundred paper-and-pencil surveys were distributed after a lecture on general management and 122 
were returned, indicating a response rate of 61%. The questionnaire consisted of English items; all 
participants were multilingual, because they had attended a lecture in the English language. To 
minimize bias because of social desirability, confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed. The 
sample consisted of 99 men (81.10%) and 23 women (18.90%), with a mean age of 39.46 (SD = 
11.91), ranging from 20 to 65 yr. The majority of the sample held a university degree (70.50%), 0.80% 
held a secondary education degree, and 28.70% a postgraduate degree. 
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Measures 
 
All items were answered on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
to indicate the extent to which the respondent agreed with the statement. Because of the limited 
timeframe, the number of scales was limited. 
Anxiety 
To measure anxiety, the STAI was used. More specifically, the items from the Anxiety scale of 
the STAI-T were used. The STAI is one of the most frequently used and long-standing measures of 
anxiety, appearing in more than 3000 studies (Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 1998). The STAI-T 
measures a stable inclination to experience anxiety, and perceive stressful situations as threatening. 
Based on the analysis of Bieling et al. (1998), all items of the Anxiety scale with a factor loading above 
.30 were used. Items were “I worry too much over stuff that doesn’t really matter,” “I have 
disturbing thoughts,” “I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind,” and “I 
get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests.” Cronbach’s  
was .63, indicating acceptable reliability for a four-item scale. 
Loss Aversion 
In preliminary study 2, the 25 items had a Cronbach’s  of .69. 
Results 
 
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the 25 proposed items of the Loss 
Aversion Questionnaire. The number of missing values was low, ranging from 0% to 0.82% and the 
distribution of the missing values was considered random (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The means of all 
items ranged from 2.43 to 3.87. All standard deviations exceeded 0.50, indicating adequate 
variability (Stumpf, Colarelli, & Hartman, 1983). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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A positive relationship was predicted between the Loss Aversion Questionnaire and the STAI, 
measuring anxiety, which was confirmed and significant (r = .298, p < .01). 
 
Study 3 
 
In study 3, the questionnaire was tested with a large number of participants in various 
positions. The 18 items with the highest item total correlation and greatest contribution to the 
overall reliability of the scale from the preliminary studies were retained for larger-scale testing. 
 
Sample and Procedure 
 
A survey was conducted among 479 participants. Six hundred paper-and-pencil surveys were 
distributed after a lecture on general management for managers (Belgium), a lecture for 
entrepreneurs (Belgium), a class of first-grade economics students (Belgium), and a congress for civil 
servants (the Netherlands). The response rate was 79%. The questionnaire consisted of English items; 
all participants were multilingual, because the congress and lectures were in the English language. To 
minimize bias because of social desirability, confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed. The 
sample consisted of 296 men (61.80%) and 180 women (37.60%), with a mean age of 35.34 (SD = 
14.22), ranging from 19 to 68 yr. Of the respondents, 0.40% held a primary school degree, 45.50% a 
secondary education degree, 41.50% a university degree (41.50%), and 4.00% a postgraduate degree. 
The sample consisted of 45 managers (9.40%), 55 entrepreneurs (11.50%), 204 students (42.60%), 
and 173 civil servants (36.10%). 
 
Measures 
 
All items were answered on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
to indicate the extent to which the respondent agreed with the statement. To select the items from 
the scales, relevance to the current study as well as high factor loadings in previous validation studies 
were taken into account. Where necessary, small adjustments were made to the items so that they 
would fit the response scale. 
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Impulsiveness 
Impulsiveness was measured by a selection of four items of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(BIS; Barratt, 1959). More specifically, items were selected from a pool of 30 items from the BIS-11, a 
self-report scale designed to measure general impulsiveness (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). 
Items were: “I act on impulse,” “I say things without thinking,” “I act on the spur of the moment,” 
and “I do things without thinking.” Cronbach’s  was .80. 
Anxiety 
Anxiety was measured using the same items as in study 2, from the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983). Cronbach’s  was .68. 
Risk Aversion 
To measure risk aversion, items were used from the DOSPERT scale (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 
2002). The DOSPERT scale was developed by Weber et al. (2002) to measure individual differences in 
attitude towards risk and is the only psychometric scale available for measuring risk aversion. From 
the original 40-item scale, 10 items were selected and adapted so that they could be answered on 
our Likert scale. An example item is “I would dare to invest 10% of my annual income in a very 
speculative stock.” Cronbach’s  was .56. 
Loss Aversion 
Eighteen items with the highest item-total correlation and highest contribution to the overall 
reliability from the scale from the preliminary studies were retained for larger-scale testing. 
Cronbach’s  was .82. 
 
Results 
 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the 18 items of the Loss Aversion 
Questionnaire. The number of missing values was low, ranging from 0% to 0.40% and the distribution 
of the missing values was considered random (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The means of all items ranged 
from 2.48 to 3.94. All standard deviations exceeded 0.50, indicating adequate variability (Stumpf et 
al., 1983). Cronbach’s  supports hypothesis 1, which states that individual differences in loss 
aversion can be measured with a psychometric questionnaire. 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
Based on an exploratory principal axis analysis with Oblimin rotation, the DOSPERT scale was 
removed because of low reliability and low factor loadings. Moreover, items 4 and 17 of the Loss 
Aversion Questionnaire were deleted because of a strong wording effect. BIS (impulsivity) loaded on 
a single factor and had no confounding characteristics with the items of the Loss Aversion 
Questionnaire. We then repeated the exploratory principal axis analysis with Oblimin rotation with 
the loss aversion and anxiety scales on two factors (Table 3). We chose Oblimin rotation given the 
correlation between the two scales. Only the items with a factor loading above .40 on the second 
factor (loss aversion), with no significant loadings (<.30) on the first factor (anxiety) were retained to 
form the final version of the Loss Aversion Questionnaire. This final version consists of seven items 
(in bold in Table 4) with a Cronbach’s  of .72. We then performed a confirmatory factor analysis 
with AMOS 19 containing three factors for the final loss aversion scale (LAQ), the impulsivity scale 
(BIS) and the anxiety scale (STAI), respectively. Modification indices indicated that covariance should 
be added between the error terms of LAQ 5 and LAQ 8. An examination of the items suggests that 
this is theoretically justifiable because both deal specifically with “coping.” Good fit is traditionally 
indicated by a nonsignificant Chi-square measure of absolute fit. However, this measure is often 
significant with a large sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Therefore, other indices that are less 
susceptible to the effects of sample size are used. Good fit is indicated by a relative likelihood ratio 
(RLR; ²/df) < 5 or 3 (Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, & Summers, 1977), a comparative fit index (CFI) > .9, 
and a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) < .06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The results 
indicated a good fit (² (100) = 221, 398, p < .001; RLR: 2.21; RMSEA = .05; and CFI = .921). 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
  
 15 
 
Sociodemographic Variables 
Gender.—Men and women did not differ significantly in their score on loss aversion (F = 
4.361, p = .102) or impulsivity (F = .158, p = .125). They did, however, differ significantly in their score 
on anxiety (F = .374, p = .003) with women scoring higher on anxiety (mean = 2.82) than men (mean 
= 2.62). 
Educational level.—Participants differed significantly according to their educational level in 
their score on loss aversion (F = 80.457, p < .001) and anxiety (F = 17.836, p < .001), and the 
difference was marginally significant in their score on impulsivity (F = 2.211, p < .10). Having a 
university or postgraduate degree (N = 198, mean = 2.82) significantly reduced displayed loss 
aversion (F = .018, p < .000) compared with secondary education (N = 207, mean = 3.44). The number 
of people with only primary school education (N = 2) was insufficient to draw valid conclusions. 
Similarly, people holding a university or postgraduate degree (N = 198, mean = 2.48) had significantly 
lower scores on anxiety (F = .852, p < .000) compared with those with only secondary education (N = 
216, mean = 2.96). A university or postgraduate degree (N = 198, mean =2.58) also meant a 
decreased impulsivity score (F = 9.519, p < .05) compared with secondary education alone (N = 207, 
mean = 2.76). 
Employment type.—Participants also differed significantly according to their employment 
type in their scores on loss aversion (F = 80.399, p < .001), anxiety (F = 19.891, p < .001), and 
impulsivity (F = 5.678, p < .001). Students displayed the highest average score on loss aversion (mean 
= 3.46) and anxiety (mean = 2.97), and entrepreneurs displayed the highest average score on 
impulsivity (mean = 2.79). The lowest average score on impulsivity (mean = 2.30) was displayed by 
managers, as well as the lowest average score on anxiety (mean = 2.43). The lowest average score on 
loss aversion (mean = 2.78) was for the civil servants group. 
Age.—Participants scored differently according to their age on loss aversion (F = 5.574, p < 
.000) and anxiety (F = 2.519, p < .000). To further explore the shape of these relations, we performed 
a median split according to age (median age = 36). Those who scored below the median (N = 228) 
displayed greater loss aversion (mean = 3.38) than those who scored above the median (N = 233, 
mean = 2.85; F = .015, p < .000). Similarly, those who scored below the median (N = 237) scored 
higher on anxiety (mean = 2.89) than those who scored above the median (N = 237, mean = 2.51; F = 
2.091, p < .000). 
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Related Variables 
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship between loss aversion, measured by the Loss 
Aversion Questionnaire, and risk aversion, measured by the DOSPERT scale. However, because of the 
low reliability of the DOSPERT scale in this study, the hypothesis cannot be tested. Similarly, 
hypothesis 3 predicted a positive relationship between the Loss Aversion Questionnaire and the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, measuring anxiety, which was confirmed and significant (r = .290, p < 
.01). A negative relationship was predicted in Hypothesis 4 between impulsivity, as measured by the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, and loss aversion, as measured by the Loss Aversion Questionnaire. 
However, the relation was not significant (r = .087, p = .09). Means, standard deviations, and 
correlations of the scales are given in Table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The present study aimed to contribute to the loss aversion literature by focusing on 
individual differences, which is a consistent gap in behavioral research (Li & Liu, 2008; Mohammed & 
Schwall, 2009; Stanovich & West, 1998). 
It was argued that loss aversion is subject to individual differences and can be seen as a 
personality trait. The question remained concerning how to measure effectively those differences. 
We argued that the current measurement methods have limitations and that loss aversion can be 
measured more effectively by using a psychometric questionnaire. Loss aversion as a personality trait 
is supported by a wide array of research results, ranging from laboratory experiments (e.g. Gächter 
et al., 2007) to neuroscientific research (e.g. Tom et al., 2007). So far, measurements of loss aversion 
are usually conducted in laboratories in the format of mathematical choice dilemmas. It was argued 
that the predictive validity of expected utility-based assessments of loss aversion is questionable, 
because such assessments typically limit choice and restrict behavior, thereby giving personality 
traits little time to manifest (Mohammed & Schwall, 2009). Issues with external validity, limited 
individual variety, and applicability for innumerate people were discussed. To measure loss aversion 
in a more valid way, a psychometric questionnaire was proposed—namely, the Loss Aversion 
Questionnaire (LAQ). 
The internal consistency of the scales was acceptable, with Cronbach’s  ranging from .68 to 
.82. An exception to the case was the DOSPERT scale with a Cronbach’s  of .56. The full version of 
the DOSPERT scale has been validated and normally shows acceptable internal consistency and 
construct reliability, ranging from .70 to .84 (Weber et al., 2002). Although the reason for our low 
Cronbach’s  remains unclear, a low reliability for the DOSPERT scale has been found before (Brown, 
2011). 
We predicted and found a significant positive relationship between loss aversion and risk 
aversion, and between loss aversion and anxiety. Although we predicted a negative relationship 
between impulsivity and loss aversion, the results show a significant positive relationship. The reason 
for this remains unclear. 
The finding that people differ significantly in their degree of displayed loss aversion according 
to educational level, employment level, and age was unexpected. Higher education seems to reduce 
the amount of displayed loss aversion, which was also noticed by Gächter et al. (2007). They refer to 
the findings from neuroscience (Tom et al., 2007), primate research (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & 
Santos, 2006), and young children (Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2001), which suggest that loss 
aversion is deeply rooted, and requires learning and experience to overcome. Following the same 
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reasoning, age should also reduce displayed loss aversion. This was confirmed by our study, with 
people below the median age scoring significantly higher on loss aversion than people above. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Because of the rather low reliability score on the DOSPERT scale, the hypothesis concerning 
risk aversion could not be tested. The correlation between impulsivity and loss aversion was not 
significant; the reason remains unclear. 
Our study aimed at a large target audience, instead of focusing on well-educated young 
people, as is the case with laboratory experiments. Although we reached a broad audience with 
regard to age (range 19–68 yr.), the educational level of respondents remained quite high with 45.5% 
holding a high school qualification and 49.3% a university or postgraduate degree. Further research 
should seek to include people with lower educational attainment. 
Likewise, future research should test the Loss Aversion Questionnaire with a longitudinal 
design, which would test for the stability of loss aversion as a personality trait. 
This paper has contributed to the loss aversion literature by shedding light on the 
psychological side of the phenomenon and highlighting the importance of individual differences in 
loss aversion. The LAQ promises to be a useful and valid questionnaire for measuring loss aversion on 
a large scale without the need to resort to mathematical choice dilemmas or other forced-choice 
laboratory tasks.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Initial Pool of Items of study 1 (N = 65) 
 
Item Mean SD 
1. If I lose a sweater at home, I keep on searching until I find it. 3.40 1.44 
2. I really don’t care if someone talks bad about me behind my back. (R) 3.55 1.15 
3. I would feel very down if I got fired, even if I know I will find a similar job. 3.48 1.23 
4. I would hate it if a colleague thought that I’m not as good in my job now as I 
was before. 
3.74 0.96 
5. In marriage, a woman should keep her own last name. 3.75 1.11 
6. In a relationship, I would hate not having my separate group of friends. 3.45 1.07 
7. Losing your house to a fire is bad, but I would manage. (R) 2.30 1.15 
8. I think eventually I could cope with losing the ability to walk. (R) 3.68 1.23 
9. I tend to keep old stuff around.  2.89 1.19 
10. If my reputation in the company takes a blow, I wouldn’t want to come to 
work anymore. 
2.75 1.21 
11. If I can’t find the documents I’m looking for, I get real nervous. 3.58 1.05 
12. Once I’ve acquired a position in the company, I wouldn’t want to take a 
step back. 
3.69 1.07 
13. I would feel very emotional if my car (bike) would be stolen. 2.97 1.40 
14. I don’t care if my boss thinks less of me than I’m really worth. (R) 3.74 1.18 
15. I don’t like throwing away stuff.  3.11 1.19 
16. I wouldn’t care if I had to move to a smaller place. (R)  3.00 1.25 
17. I’d rather quit than get fired.  4.02 1.09 
18. I would never accept a job that has less pay than my previous/current one. 2.36 1.02 
19. I wouldn’t like it if the company changed our way of working.  2.46 1.03 
20. I don’t care what people would think if I was suddenly unemployed. (R) 3.11 1.32 
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TABLE 2 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Initial Pool of Items of study 2 (N = 122) 
 
Item Mean SD 
1. If I lose a sweater at home, I keep on searching until I find it. 3.43 1.13 
2. I really don’t care if someone talks bad about me behind my back. (R) 3.82 0.98 
3. I would feel very down if I got fired, even if I know I will find a similar job. 3.61 1.10 
4. I would hate it if a colleague thought that I’m not as good in my job now as I 
was before. 
3.71 0.90 
5. In marriage, a woman should keep her own last name.  3.77 1.03 
6. In a relationship, I would hate not having my separate group of friends. 3.06 0.99 
7. Losing your house to a fire is bad, but I would manage. (R) 2.43 0.88 
8. I think eventually I could cope with losing the ability to walk. (R) 3.33 1.16 
9. I tend to keep old stuff around. 3.36 1.15 
10. If my reputation in the company takes a blow, I wouldn’t want to come to 
work anymore. 
2.48 0.83 
11. If I can’t find the documents I’m looking for, I get real nervous. 3.37 0.90 
12. Once I’ve acquired a position in the company, I wouldn’t want to take a step 
back. 
3.47 1.07 
13. I would feel very emotional if my car (bike) would be stolen. 3.18 1.14 
14. It’s horrible if your boss thinks less of you than you’re really worth. 3.87 0.88 
15. I don’t like throwing away stuff.  3.30 1.16 
16. I would have problems with having to move to a smaller place.  2.98 1.04 
17. I’d rather quit than get fired. 3.58 1.14 
18. I would have no problem accepting a job that has less pay than my 
previous/current one. (R) 
3.09 1.03 
19. I would feel very tense if the company changed our way of working. 2.50 0.91 
20. I don’t care what people would think if I was suddenly unemployed. (R 3.18 1.05 
21. I always save my computer files on different locations.  3.40 1.32 
22. I think I could cope losing all my belongings in a fire. (R) 3.17 1.08 
23. I think I would go crazy, being locked up in prison.  3.67 1.16 
24. I would be okay with trading my current car (bike) for a cheaper model. (R) 2.99 1.12 
25. I get easily attached to material things (my car, my furniture, ..). 3.07 1.07 
  
 25 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Items of study 3 (N = 479) 
 
Item Mean SD 
1. It’s horrible if your boss thinks less of you than you’re really worth. 3.94 0.86 
2. I get easily attached to material things (my car, my furniture, ..).  2.97 1.10 
3. I would have problems with having to move to a smaller place. 2.98 1.12 
4. I tend to keep old stuff around.   2.88 1.07 
5. I think eventually I could cope with losing the ability to walk. (R) 3.32 1.18 
6. I go crazy if I lose something, even when it’s not that important.   2.65 1.11 
7. Once I’ve acquired a position in the company, I wouldn’t want to take a step 
back. 
3.52 1.04 
8. I think I could cope losing all my belongings in a fire. (R) 3.23 1.15 
9. I would feel very down if I got fired, even if I know I will find a similar job. 3.33 1.04 
10. I don’t care what people would think if I was suddenly unemployed. (R) 3.13 1.07 
11. I don’t like throwing away stuff.  2.95 1.11 
12. I would feel very emotional if my car (bike) would be stolen. 3.11 1.15 
13. I feel awful if someone talks bad about me behind my back. 3.60 1.01 
14. I would hate it if a colleague thought that I’m not as good in my job now as I 
was before. 
3.49 0.91 
15. Losing your house to a fire is bad, but I would manage. (R) 2.49 0.98 
16. I would feel very tense if the company changed our way of working.   2.50 0.88 
17. I would have no problem accepting a job that has less pay than my 
previous/current one. (R) 
3.26 1.02 
18. I would be okay with trading my current car (bike) for a cheaper model. (R) 
  
2.74 1.03 
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TABLE 4a – 4b – 4c – 4d  
 
Principal axis analysis with Direct Oblimin rotation (STAI & LAQ) 
 
 
4a. Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter. .388 .450 
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests. .195 .168 
I have disturbing thoughts. .304 .301 
I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind. .355 .417 
It’s horrible if your boss thinks less of you than you’re really worth. .270 .178 
I get easily attached to material things (my car, my furniture, ..) .251 .249 
I would have problems with having to move to a smaller place. .166 .138 
I think eventually I could cope with losing the ability to walk. .291 .239 
I feel awful if someone talks bad about me behind my back. .253 .200 
I go crazy if I lose something, even when it’s not that important. .331 .322 
I think I could cope losing all my belongings in a fire. .428 .270 
Once I’ve acquired a position in the company, I wouldn’t want to take a step back. .265 .206 
Losing your house to a fire is bad, but I would manage. .454 .333 
I would hate it if a colleague thought that I’m not as good in my job now as I was before. .338 .221 
I would feel very down if I got fired, even if I know I will find a similar job. .286 .251 
I don’t care what people would think if I was suddenly unemployed. .303 .293 
I would feel very tense if the company changed our way of working. .242 .238 
I would have no problem accepting a job that has less pay than my previous/current one. .294 .299 
I would be okay with trading my current car (bike) for a cheaper model. .341 .395 
I would feel very emotional if my car (bike) would be stolen. .251 .214 
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4b Pattern Matrix 
 
 Factor 
1 2 
I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter. .699 -.061 
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests. .447 -.096 
I have disturbing thoughts. .594 -.115 
I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind. .637 .017 
It’s horrible if your boss thinks less of you than you’re really worth. .230 .261 
I get easily attached to material things (my car, my furniture, ..) .066 .465 
I would have problems with having to move to a smaller place. -.009 .375 
I think eventually I could cope with losing the ability to walk. .029 .474 
I feel awful if someone talks bad about me behind my back. .419 .052 
I go crazy if I lose something, even when it’s not that important. .470 .164 
I think I could cope losing all my belongings in a fire. .055 .491 
Once I’ve acquired a position in the company, I wouldn’t want to take a step back. .027 .440 
Losing your house to a fire is bad, but I would manage. .159 .483 
I would hate it if a colleague thought that I’m not as good in my job now as I was before. .389 .136 
I would feel very down if I got fired, even if I know I will find a similar job. .406 .157 
I don’t care what people would think if I was suddenly unemployed. .333 .296 
I would feel very tense if the company changed our way of working. .351 .209 
I would have no problem accepting a job that has less pay than my previous/current one. -.096 .587 
I would be okay with trading my current car (bike) for a cheaper model. -.120 .678 
I would feel very emotional if my car (bike) would be stolen. .254 .284 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of total variance accounted for 
5.005 
25.025% 
1.783 
8.916% 
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4c. Structure Matrix 
 
Factor 
1 2 
I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter. .669 .275 
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests. .401 .119 
I have disturbing thoughts. .539 .171 
I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind. .646 .324 
It’s horrible if your boss thinks less of you than you’re really worth. .355 .371 
I get easily attached to material things (my car, my furniture, ..) .289 .496 
I would have problems with having to move to a smaller place. .171 .371 
I think eventually I could cope with losing the ability to walk. .257 .488 
I feel awful if someone talks bad about me behind my back. .445 .254 
I go crazy if I lose something, even when it’s not that important. .549 .390 
I think I could cope losing all my belongings in a fire. .292 .518 
Once I’ve acquired a position in the company, I wouldn’t want to take a step back. .239 .453 
Losing your house to a fire is bad, but I would manage. .392 .560 
I would hate it if a colleague thought that I’m not as good in my job now as I was before. .454 .323 
I would feel very down if I got fired, even if I know I will find a similar job. .481 .352 
I don’t care what people would think if I was suddenly unemployed. .476 .456 
I would feel very tense if the company changed our way of working. .452 .378 
I would have no problem accepting a job that has less pay than my previous/current one. .187 .541 
I would be okay with trading my current car (bike) for a cheaper model. .206 .620 
I would feel very emotional if my car (bike) would be stolen. .390 .406 
 
4d. Factor Correlation Matrix 
Factor 1 2 
1 1.000 .481 
2 .481 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.   
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.  
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TABLE 5 
 
Means, Standard Devations and Intercorrelations (N = 479) 
 
Scale Mean SD LAQ BIS STAI DOSPERT 
LAQ 3.07 0.65 .82    
BIS 2.65 0.74 .078 .80   
STAI 2.70 0.72 .290** .237** .68  
DOSPERT 2.75 0.44 .322** .001 .259** .56 
 
** p < .01; Cronbach’s α in bold on diagonal 
 
 
 
